UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25668
26 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 820 (1993)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In operative paragraph 8 of its resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council containing an account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of his report of 26 March 1993 (S/25479) and detailed proposals for the implementation of the Peace Plan, including arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons, based inter alia on consultations with Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements.

2. Despite the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in recent weeks and, in particular, the intensive round of talks conducted by Lord Owen from 21 to 25 April 1993, the Bosnian Serbs have not signed the Peace Plan. It is not, therefore, possible to judge when, or even if, it will be implemented. However, the following report outlines for the information of the Security Council the preparatory activities which the Secretary-General has undertaken in the hope that the Peace Plan would be accepted by all the parties concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

II. PREPARATIONS FOR MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS

3. The agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina which is reproduced as Annex IV to Security Council document S/25479 includes a wide range of measures requiring the deployment of additional peace-keeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These measures include the cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the restoration of infrastructure, the opening of routes, the separation of forces, the demilitarization of Sarajevo, the monitoring of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the return of forces to designated provinces.

4. At a very early stage of the negotiations led by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia it became obvious that the multitude of tasks envisaged in the Peace Plan would exceed the planning capability of the Secretariat and that of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). At the time, Member States acting in the context

of a regional arrangement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had initiated preliminary studies on the subject. The Secretary-General in a letter dated 11 December 1992 invited the Secretary-General of NATO to share any relevant information on these preliminary studies with the United Nations. Since then, NATO delegations have visited United Nations Headquarters in New York on 3 March, 29 March and 7 April 1993, for informal exchanges of views with the Department of Peace-keeping Operations. In addition, NATO military teams visited UNPROFOR in Zagreb to explore operational requirements should NATO be invited to plan for the implementation of the Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. In the context of these consultations, a broad operational concept has emerged, the details of which would be subject to further planning and, in particular, to approval by the Security Council and the Member States concerned. The implementation would involve a United Nations operation conducted under the authority of the Security Council and financed collectively by United Nations Member States under the peace-keeping scale of assessments. The United Nations would have overall political and strategic control which would be exercised by the Secretary-General under the authority of the Security Council.

6. The NATO interlocutors indicated that NATO would be willing to consider a formal request to undertake detailed planning for the implementation of the Plan, including ground reconnaissance and related activities. If requested, they would also consider making available a core headquarters structure into which other potential troop contributors could be incorporated. On the basis of preliminary studies, they estimated that some 60,000 to 75,000 troops would be required for the implementation of the various military tasks envisaged in the Peace Plan.

7. The withdrawal of heavy weapons is part of the agreement on cessation of hostilities annexed to the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25479). In a letter dated 2 March addressed to the Co-Chairman, the then Force Commander of UNPROFOR, General Satish Nambiar, said that once substantial numbers of additional troops arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be possible to deal fully with the concerns of both the Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs. He considered that, with sufficient numbers of troops, physical control of heavy weapons could be undertaken, thus meeting the concerns of the Bosnian Government, and that there could then be adequate deployment of ground troops and observers to ensure physical separation of the opposing forces, which would meet one of the concerns of the Bosnian Serbs (S/25403, para. 10). The matter was raised in the informal talks with the representatives of NATO and, accordingly, would be given the appropriate attention in the final deployment plan and concept of operations for the implementation of the Peace Plan.

III. PREPARATIONS FOR CIVILIAN ARRANGEMENTS

8. The principal civilian tasks envisaged in the Peace Plan include

- the restoration of law, order and civil authority throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina in conformity with the nine constitutional principles;

- the preparation of a constitution in accordance with the nine principles;

- the resolution of problems concerning provincial borders, and related political issues;

- the preparation of internationally supervised, free and fair elections to be held for the central government as well as the provincial governments;

- the provision of arrangements for the highest level of internationally recognized human rights through domestic and international mechanisms;

- the reversal of "ethnic cleansing" and the establishment of conditions in which those refugees and displaced persons who wish to return to their homes may do so;

- the provision of humanitarian aid and appropriate levels of relief and rehabilitation assistance.

9. The majority of these tasks will require close coordination and cooperation between the military and civilian components of the operation not only in terms of their respective mandates but also in terms of logistical and administrative arrangements. This coordination would be exercised by an official appointed by the Secretary-General.

10. The tasks foreseen in the Peace Plan would require expertise in restoration and maintenance of civil law and order; in civil mediation and reconciliation; in the human rights and humanitarian fields; in legal and constitutional matters; in planning, organizing and supervision of elections; in establishing and maintaining close relations with the central government and the provincial governments; and in civil reconstruction projects. While a number of these tasks could be handled by an extensive, well trained and qualified United Nations Civil Police (UNCIVPOL) contingent, additional expertise in human rights and election monitoring, legal, administrative and even civil engineering matters would be required. Moreover, the importance of an effective public information programme cannot be over-emphasized. The successful implementation of the Peace Plan would, to a large extent, depend on the ability to reach out to the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to explain the objectives of the United Nations presence.

11. More detailed plans for the implementation of the multitude of responsibilities emanating from the various provisions of the Peace Plan were being drawn up. Preliminary studies had already revealed that the magnitude and complexity of the tasks involved would require a flexible approach in identifying the necessary human resources. It had become clear that the number of staff required could not be met from the existing staff resources of the United Nations which are already stretched to the limit because of the many requirements of existing peace-keeping and other missions. Assistance by Member States would therefore be essential both in the secondment of personnel and, in appropriate cases, the identification of qualified personnel who met the standards established by the United Nations Charter. I would of course take the necessary steps to adapt and streamline the relevant internal procedures so as

to enable the Organization to respond to the civilian staffing requirements of the Peace Plan in a flexible and expeditious manner.

12. With regard to the proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of my report of 26 March 1993 (S/25479), I had carefully studied the requirements for establishing the International Human Rights Monitoring Mission. It would be my intention that, as the Peace Plan was accepted by all concerned, I would designate the Human Rights Commissioner and report to the Council on the human and financial resources required for the Monitoring Mission. Likewise, upon completion of signature of the Peace Plan, I would also designate, in consultation with the Co-Chairmen, the members of the Boundary Commission and inform the Council on the resources required for the operation of that Commission in the context of a detailed report on the overall requirements for the implementation of the Peace Plan.